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Abstract
The European Union import policy for bananas grants preferential trade access for ACP bananas and
discriminates against bananas from other sources. It is shown that such trade discrimination cannot  be defended
by development-related motives.  As a form of aid transfer to banana-exporting ACP countries,  the EU import
regime is highly inefficient.  The effective value of financial transfers is low, while there are large associated
welfare costs to domestic consumers and to non-preferred export  countries.  Liberalization of banana imports
would create huge welfare gains which can easily be used to compensate potential losers. It is proposed that the
compensation package is given the form of an International Banana Agreement.  The presence of third-party
gains from  trade liberalization can be used to negotiate non-EU involvement in the international agreement. The
agreement makes it possible to reconcile a commitment to free banana trade, promotion of ecological
sustainability in banana production and promotion of so&-economic  development interests of bananaexporting
countries.
Introduction
Bananas form the fifth largest tropical export crop. About 40 per cent of all exports have the European
Union as destination. The European banana import regime affects many developing country producers
of export bananas. This article argues that a reform of the European banana import regime could pave
the road to an International Banana Agreement that reconciles market efficiency goals, development
goals and environmental goals.
Most European countries have a long tradition in regulated banana import policies. Signing of the Rome
Treaty which formed the basis for the European Community, was even postponed for a few days until a
separate Banana Protocol was added to the Treaty. The 1992 unification of the internal European
market brought a uniform European import regime for bananas. It is closely entangled with the Lome
Agreement between the European Union and former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
regions (ACP). ACP countries enjoy privileged access to the European market, mainly to the detriment
of producers in Central and South America. Because a large part of Latin American banana exports is
dominated by three large US companies, these exports are often adduced to as ‘dollar bananas’. Large-
scale production methods makes dollar bananas generally much cheaper than ACP-bananas.
I The author is with the Economics Department and the Economic and Social Institute of the Free University in
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Increasing friction over the current EU banana market regime has accumulated between the commercial
parties and countries, inside and outside the European Union. The item nearly caused a trade war
between the USA and the EU. After complaints by governments of dollar banana countries and the USA
before WTO trade panels, the WTO Appellate Body in 1997 came with a final verdict that makes a
change in European banana policy unavoidable. Also from another perspective, change is laying ahead.
The current Lome Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries has to be renewed in the year
2000. In its Green Paper the European Commission (1996) announced that revision of the agreement is
desirable from several perspectives. The Banana Protocol of the Lome Agreement which considerable
constrained the EU’s policy margin expires in December 2002. At that time also the Framework
Agreement of the EU with four dollar banana suppliers expires. Therefore, institutional and legal
possibilities for substantial change come into sight.
The article has the following structure. Section 2 is an attempt to disentangle the different lines of
argument in the debate for revision of the present EU banana regime. In the subsequent three sections
three major aspects of this debate are dealt with in further detail. Section 3 surveys the evidence on
welfare costs and benefits of the banana regime. An important element in the discussion on the
European banana policy is about the best way to help those countries which are extremely dependent on
banana exports. Section 4 answers the question whether differences in economic and social development
of banana-exporting countries can justify the present EU banana policy. Section 5 focuses on
environmental aspects of banana production in relation to trade preferences. Section 6 launches a
proposal to use potential welfare gains from  liberalized EU banana trade in a package deal that
compensates the potential losers in ACP countries. The package deal is shaped in the form of an
International Banana Agreement. The final section summarizes the overall conclusions.
Overview of the banana trade controversy
Debate on the EU banana regime has been criticized from different view angles: welfare considerations,
development arguments, competition policy, environmental considerations and arguments related to
labour  standards. Proposals to reform the import regime reflect the different perspectives. In order to
clarify further discussion first an attempt will be made to disentangle the different threads of argument.
EU consumet  welfare Many studies by now have documented and analyzed welfare costs and
distributional consequences of the current banana regime. Due to the import regime, European
consumers pay much higher prices and have lower banana quality. The import regime creates free quota
rents which for European banana marketing companies, at the expense of consumers. Banana producers
in ‘dollar banana’ countries are artificially put at disadvantage by the regime. Research findings on this
issue will be presented in section three of this article.
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Development objectives. The prime motivation for the present EU banana regime is that it helps poor
countries whose economy is highly dependent on banana exports, i.e. the ACP exporters in general and
more in particular for the Caribbean Windward Islands. The questions whether such claims are justified
and whether a discriminatory import regime for bananas is an efficient instrument to serve these goals
form the subject of section four of this article.
Competition policy for the banana industry. Competition policy is a subject matter that has become
increasingly intermingled with discussion of the EU banana regime. Welfare analyses of the EU banana
scheme are sometimes criticized, pointing at the fact that a free EU banana market will be an oligopolist
market, dominated by three large US banana multinationals. However, the prime goal of the EU banana
regime was not to change the market structure of the industry, but rather, to help the economies of the
banana-dependent former colonies. The EU has more targeted instruments (e.g. based on articles 85 and
86 of the Rome Treaty) to intervene in case of market power abuse by large banana companies.2  Even
with an oligopolist market structure, market prices for bananas in open markets (USA, Germany before
1993) have been far lower than in the regulated EU market.
Environmental issues. A further line of argument in the debate on the EU banana policy relates to
environmental considerations. ACP bananas, particularly those from smallholders in the Caribbean
region, are generally produced in an environmentally more sustainable way than bananas from large
estates in the dollar banana countries. Ecological sustainability in the latter case is often threatened by
large amounts of pesticides which end up in the local environment, causing harm to humans, wildlife,
local ecological systems. In smallholder banana production little or no pesticides are used, due to the
costs of such inputs and due to lower pest incidence in small-scale, inter-cropped production systems.
Mono-crop banana plantations are more pest-prone, while the companies’ desire to meet premium
consumer demand for long, unblemished bananas leads to additional use of chemical pesticides and
growth regulators. The productivity gap between ACP smallholder production of bananas and large-
scale production in ‘dollar banana’ plantations might shrink when negative environmental externalities
caused by banana production were taken into account. However, it does not follow that dollar bananas
should receive a less preferential treatment in EU banana policy. Most environmental externalities
caused by banana production are local externalities, without massive transborder welfare effects. If
local environmental externalities dominate the scene, policy primacy should rest with local or national
governments in the producer countries, rather than with the European Commission. If EU consumers
prefer bananas which are produced in an environmentally sound way, then it does make sense to arrive
at voluntary ecolabelling schemes for bananas. Some are already in operation in the EU. They create a
’ Effectiveness of these instruments has been shown in 1973 and in 1992 with regard to market power abuse by
Chiqui ta .
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basis for product differentiation and price premiums for bananas (from ACP countries or elsewhere)
which have been produced in an ecologically sound way.
Arguments related to labour standards. Some proposals for reform of the EU banana import regime
suggest that more weight should be given to minimum social standards in banana production.
Particularly the banana multinationals have a long record of union-busting and denial of workers’ rights
in banana-producing countries.3  Their plantation labourers have widely suffered from health hazards
(diseases, infertility, lethal accidents) related to the excessive use of agrochemicals in large-scale banana
production. Central American banana estates have used pesticide types like DBCP of which application
has long been forbidden in their countries of origin.4  Epidemiological research shows disquieting results.
The incidence of workers suffering pesticide intoxication is estimated to be 3 per cent of the working
population in all developing countries. For Costa Rica in general it is 4.3 per cent, while for the banana
region in Costa Rica, Regihn Huetar  Atltitica, it is 6.6 per cent (Anon., 1992a; Hemandez and Wit&,
1996: 175). Because of these intolerable working conditions and labour  practices, it has been proposed
to apply social minimum criteria in European trade preferences for bananas (WINFA,  1997). However
justified the social claims by plantation workers in dollar banana countries may be, their position is only
indirectly related to the EU import regime for bananas. The companies often stress that they operate
according to national legislation of the production countries. If this is not the case, then banana worker
unions may of course sue them in local courts. When unions find insufficient support for their rightful
claims in national legislation, then the most obvious step is to undertake political action to improve such
legislation. International support from  trade unions which organize workers in other parts of these
vertically-integrated banana companies is the next step; this is the very task of international labour
union organizations. Since banana companies with own brand names are very keen to avoid a negative
consumer imago, banana worker unions may well strengthen their case by joining with consumer
organizations and NGOs in EU import markets. It is neither obvious nor necessary that these issues be
linked to a reform of the EU banana regime. Indeed, it can be argued that job opportunities of plantation
workers will increase due to a liberalized banana trade. Improved bargaining positions vis-i-vis their
employers may lead to higher wage levels, improved labour  union rights and better labour  conditions.
3 Recent cases are documented in: Banana Trade News Bulletin; Mokhiber &Wheat (1995); Verburg (1998);
Chambron & Smith (1998).
4 Although domest ic  use of  the highly toxic  pest icide DBCP was forbidden in the USA in 1977,  i t  has  been widely
applied by the US banana companies during the period between 1965 and 1990. These companies now have been
named in class action lawsuits on behalf of more than 10,000 banana workers in 11 developing countries. The
banana worker suits allege that as early as 1961, research by Dow Chemical and the University of California
indicated that  DBCP is  highly toxic,  and that  i ts  vapours alone can do damage to sperm cells ,  l ivers  and kidneys (cf .
Mokhiber & Wheat 1995). The companies which produced the chemical have offered an out-of-court settlement
(Banana Trade News Bulletin, Nov. 1997).
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Conclusion. The European import regime for bananas has become subject of lobby activities by various
parties. Labour standard issues, competition policy arguments and environment-related arguments
cannot form justified motives for further trade discrimination. The real issues which deserve further
analysis are welfare effects of the import regime and the validity of development-related considerations
which motivate the present policy. Voluntary ecolabelling schemes for bananas could well become part
of the compensation package for potential losers of a liberalized European banana trade. These issues
will subsequently be dealt with in greater detail.
Welfare anal&s of the present EU  banana regime
Welfare analysis of a policy makes it necessary to identify relevant parties and their welfare interests.
Some will gain and others will lose when the EU banana import regime is reformed. Table 1 lists
welfare positions of producers, traders, consumers and governments. I will be used as a vantage point
for a more detailed discussion.
Consumer in&rests. In money terms, the largest welfare concerns European consumers. They pay
much higher banana prices than they would have had to pay with completely free trade. The reference
point can be the German banana market where imports were completely free before 1 993.5  Other
countries (Benelux, Denmark, Ireland) till then applied a uniform 20% tariff on banana imports, or used
a combination of import quota and tariffs (UK, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal) Portugal and Greece).
Graph1  EUamsmerprices~  1999
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Import quotas were used to
grant preferential trade access
for former colonies in Africa
and the Caribbean. Some
countries also used quotas to
preserve part of their national
markets for domestic but
expensive p r o d u c t i o n  o f
bananas: Spain (from Canary
Islands), Portugal (Madeira), Greece (Crete), France (Guadeloupe, Martinique). Pre-1993 differences
in consumer prices for bananas are shown in Graph 1. Consumers in countries that applied both tariffs
and quota paid the highest prices for bananas, followed by those that just applied a simple import tariff,
with consumers in the open German market paying the lowest price. It is worth noting that price in
’ Also Sweden, Austria and Finland had open banana markets before their entry in the EU. Germany had
negotiated free banana imports in a special  protocol of Rome Treaty.
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Germany were lowest even though the German market was and is dominated by large oligopolist banana
companies.6
T a b l e  I Dominant welfare positions with regard to liberalized EU banana imports
‘Player’
groups
Dominant parties Main welfare interests
zonsumers  EU consumers . Price level of bananas
. Banana qua l i ty
. Concern  on  eco log ica l  sus ta inab i l i t y  and soc ia l  cond i t ions
US consumers . Effect of EU banana regime on US consumer price
. Banana qua l i ty
. Concern  on  eco log ica l  sus ta inab i l i t y  and soc ia l  cond i t ions
‘reducers Producers  o f  the . Trade oppor tun i t ies  in  EU
Windward Is lands . Income and  employment  oppor tun i t ies  f rom banana expor ts
independent  banana . Trade oppor tun i t ies  in  EU
producers  in  do l la r . Profits from banana exports to EU
banana countr ies
Producers  in  the non- . Income and employment  oppor tun i t ies  f rom cur ren t  banana
Car ibbean  ACP exports to the EU
count r ies
European producers  . Income en employment  oppor tun i t ies  a r is ing  f rom bananas
and French ‘oversea produced under the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU
ter r i to r ies ’ . income and employment  oppor tun i t ies  ar is ing  f rom bananas
Large vertically- . Market access to EU countries;
in tegrated banana . Capacity use in their ‘dollar banana’ production;
companies specialized . Add i t iona l  inves tment  in  ACP banana product ion ;
in  ‘do l lar  bananas’ . Pr ice  war  in  non-EU marke ts  (p redominant l y  USA) ;
. Obtaining a share in lucrative European quota rents
rraders Banana t rad ing . Market share in EU
compan ies  wh i ch . Profits from (free) quota rents
marke t  ACP bananas  in . Investment in dollar banana countries to meet market demand
the EU under  EU impor t  l i censes
Sovern- EU Commission and EU . Food cost levels for EU consumers
nents governments . Revenue collection from import tariffs and quota rents
. Bureaucra t i c  cos ts  o f  imp lement ing  cur ren t  EU banana reg ime
. Goa ls  o f  EU deve lopment  po l i cy
. Re fo rm o f  EU common agr i cu l tu ra l  po l i cy
. Renewal  and rev is ion  o f  Lome  Agreement
Gove rnmen ts  ACP . Direct incomes generated by banana exports to EU
count r ies . Positive economic externalities of banana exports
. Expor t  d ivers i f i ca t ion  oppor tun i t ies
. Trade and aid benefits under the Lome  Agreement
US government . Protection of profit interests of US banana multinationals
. Low banana p r i ces  fo r  US consumers
. Control of immigration from the Caribbean
. Control of drug imports from the Caribbean region
. Political stability in the Caribbean
6 Deodhar and Sheldon (1995) show that  the German banana market  was and is  not  a fully competi t ive market ,  but
they found no evidence that  ol igopolis t  firms  applied collusive dump pricing methods.  Moreover,  US prices are even
considerably lower than German prices, Therefore, German banana prices before 1993 can well be taken as a
approxrmation  of prices under an open trade regime.
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Many estimates are available of the welfare costs for EU consumers, using different models,
assumptions and base years. Annex Table A2 presents eight of these estimates. The combined annual
welfare loss for EU consumers is estimated to be in the range between 579 mhr and 1600 mln US dollar.
This is the amount that could be gained when in 1993 the European banana trade would have been
liberalized.
However, the EU in 1993 decided for a uniform European banana import regime built on origin-
dependent quota, tariffs and import licenses. European and ACP bananas were given preferential trade
access with a quota level higher than what these producers delivered up to then. Remaining import
demand could be provided by other countries under a uniform import tariff (100 ECU/ton).’ Because of
the different national banana policies, introduction of the policy package had a differentiated effect on
consumers in EU member countries. The largest welfare loss fell upon German consumers. Several
estimates of their combined loss are presented in Annex Table Al, using different assumptions and
estimation methods. The estimates quantify the welfare loss for German consumers between 106 mhr
and 800 mhr annually. Put otherwise, this is approximately the welfare gam.for Germany that could be
achieved by again converting EU import policy to an open trading system. All estimates agree that the
1993 banana regime had the most positive effect on consumer welfare in France and the UK, which
formerly had the most policy-distorted banana markets. Graph 2 shows that these countries experienced
a fall in real import prices compared to prices in 1989. The same happened in Spain, Portugal and
Greece (not shown in graph 2).8
Graph 2 Change in real import prices bananas, 1989-96 1
Swltzetland
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% change in real import prices of bananas, 1989 USS Source: Table :
Real import prices increased in all other EU countries. Estimates of the overall welfare effects for EU
consumers give mixed results, depending on the applied model, the underlying assumptions and the
’ Further details can be found in EC Council Regulation 404/93 and in Hallam and Peston  ( 1997: 8-l 3).
* Note that import prices do not coincide with consumer prices, because of trade margins and because some EU
countries have an ‘own’ banana production (Greece, Spain, Portugal,  France).
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choice of reference period. Bore11 (1994; 1997) estimates that the total welfare loss for European
consumers increased due to the 1993 reform, from 1600 mln to 2300 mln US dollar. Guyomard et al.
(1996) also found an increase, but only by a negligible 2 mhr US dollar, while Euro PA (1995)
estimated that the total European welfare cost due to the reform decreased by 600-800 mln US dollar.
ln a forward-looking perspective it is only interesting which welfare gains for EU consumers can be
accomplished by liberalizing banana trade. Comparison of banana import prices with those prevailing in
non-EU countries yields a first approximation of the potential gains. In Table 2 current and historical
import prices are related to those in the USA. It appears that in 1996 EU import prices are generally
double those prevailing the USA; only part of this difference can be explained by transport costs. The
T a b l e  2 Comparison of banana import prices, EU and other OECD countries 1989-96
_il-y  Y - 1..
Country
~_---.  Yyy  -. -.. .  - .  ..-...  .Y
1996 aver . Price t&o 1989 average price’  ratio Real price
impor t  pr i ce  ” 1 9 9 6 impor t  pr i ce  ” 1 9 8 9 increase b,  i n
in US%/yon (USA=1 00) in LJSMon (USA=1 00) %,  1989-96
~ -- -__-~---- ---~--. ~-
non-EU countries
USA
Canada
New Zealand
Japan
EU countries
365 1 0 0 356 1 0 0 -17.3
428 117 398 1 1 2 -13.3
465 1 2 7 506 1 4 2 -25.8
531 145 573 161 -25.3
France 632 1 7 3 788 221 -35.3
ltal~ 709 1 9 4 466 131 22.8
Germany 750 205 482 1 3 5 25.7
Un. Kingdom 759 208 7 0 1 197 -12.7
Ireland 761 208 422 1 1 8 45.5
Denmark 791 216 528 148 20.8
Netherlands 801 219 524 147 23.2
Belgium 880 241 414 1 1 6 71.3.T: ~..._ .~  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -- . . . . . . . ...” . - . . ------- ---
Notes: a) Average import unit values for bananas from  all sources. b) Nominal 1996 import prices have been
converted in constant 1989 US dollars by the deflator for the US GDP. Data sources: import data from UNSD
COh4TFL4DE  database, Geneva; deflator for US GDP is from  &IF, International Financial Statistics.
price difference with the USA and other OECD countries with open banana import regimes has clearly
deteriorated since 1989. Given these price differences, it should not come as a surprise that all estimates
of the welfare effect for EU consumers in case of liberalized banana trade, show a huge potential gain,
ranging from 800 to 2300 mhr US$ (cf. Annex Table A2). It should not be too difficult to compensate
potential losers of liberalized trade from such a huge amount. Matthews (1994: 19-21) calculated that a
combination of liberalization with full financial compensation to bananaexporting ACP countries (340
mln ECU) would still yield a net welfare surplus for European consumers (126 mhr ECU).
A liberalized EU banana trade may also affect consumers in the USA and other import countries. In the
short term they might see banana prices go up; and this effect may last until production capacity has
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adapted to higher EU import levels. This future course of events results from standard international
trade theory. When a large import country like the EU opens up its markets, this causes world market
shortages (at least temporarily) which push up the world market pri~e.~ Adaptation of banana supply
capacity by large companies could be relatively fast, because they have the short-term possibility to
diminish the share of rejected sub-standard bananas.
Producer  interests. Together, world banana producers would benefit from EU trade liberalization.
Total world demand levels would go up, and also world market prices for bananas increase, at least in
the short to medium term until production capacity has been adapted. The largest gains in banana
exports will be booked by the most competitive producers, i.e. the producers in dollar banana countries.
Dominant producers in this region still are the US banana multinationals, but national producers like
: Costs of banana production a), 1992-93Graph 3
q Dominica I# Grenada a  Cote d’lvoire  El  St. Lucia q St Vincent n Cameroon
k24 Jamaica q Colombia 0  Costa Rica n Ecuador
Note:
I) F.o.b.  costs mainly consist of labour and material inputs in crop husbandry, harvesting packing and handhng,  Cost estimates for Costa Rica
kador  and Colombia only include variable costs.  Source: compiled by Hallam  &  P&cm (1997: 23) fkxn  FAOdata  (Review of costs o
woduQion,  trade and distribution of bananas in sel&~ countries. Rome, 1994) and CIRADdata (Evaluation de la competitivitk de 1:
wodudion des bananas  des pays ACP, Rapport Final, Montpellier  1995).
Noboa (Ecuador) have expanded fastly. The position of US banana multinationals has somewhat
changed since the early 1990s  since they have built up production capacity in African ACP countries
and in Europe (Dole), in order to be eligible for lucrative EU import licenses.r”
ACP producers lose their preferred trade access to the EU. Since their  cost price levels are much higher
than in case of dollar banana producers (cf. Graph 3), they may not be able to benefit from larger EU
demand. Worse, they probably lose considerable parts of their current EU import shares (e.g. Ross-
9 The opposite happens when a large country imposes tariffs and quota (see e.g. Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994;
Deardorff, 1994). The price decrease in non-EU countries between 1989 and 1996 as shown in Graph 2 and Table 2
reflects increased protectionism in the EU, although improved productivity in banana production may also explain
part of the price fall.
lo Moreover, in Latin America they increasingly leave banana production to outgrowers, national companies who
run the plantat ions and supply bananas on a contract  basis.
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Robinson, 1997). Smallholder banana producers in high-cost ACP countries, like the Caribbean
Windward Islands, form the most periled group of producers. High cost prices of their bananas are
partly related to small plot sizes and hilly terrains.
Banana producers in the EU or in so-called ‘overseas territories’ will also be affected  negatively by an
open EU banana market, since these producers are mostly high-cost producers. Their income position is,
however, less in peril because they are entitled to deficiency payments under the EU Common
Agricultural Policy, and possibly also under the EU’s regional development programmes. These
payments will compensate income shortfalls and facilitate investment in a broadened production base.
Traders’ inta&s. Trading companies which market ACP bananas in the EU have been among those
who benefited most of the 1993 policy reform. European traders were granted free import licenses for
the formerly open EU countries (new market area), whereas they were also allowed to market 30% of all
dollar bananas (new product) alongside their traditional trade in ACP bananas. Allotment of dollar
banana licenses led to vocal protests by US banana companies backed by the US government.  The
protest culminated in threat of US trade retaliation, and in a WTO panel procedure. In I997 the
Appellate Body of the WTO decided that the EU should alter its quota allocation system.
Government interests. The European Commission’s policy margin with respect to banana imports is
constrained by obligations following from international treaties (Lome,  Framework Agreement with
Latin American banana producing countries, WTO). EU policy concerns with respect to a liberalization
of banana imports include consumer welfare, development policy, implementation costs and tax
receipts. Development aspects of the EU trade regime are dealt with in next section. The present banana
import system requires detailed market intervention with specific tariff quota for specific economic
activities like producing and purchasing, transport and ripening of bananas.” The associated
bureaucracy costs are high. Most of such costs are avoidable in an open market system combined with
direct aid transfers. Banana import taxes are now collected on dollar banana imports. Complete
liberalization mean that these import levies are foregone; the loss will be partly compensated by higher
receipts of value-added taxes.
Caribbean governments have repeatedly stressed that banana exports to the EU are a lifeline for their
economies, claiming that - without these exports - their economies will collapse. According to them
considerable parts of agricultural employment and incomes would disappear due to EU import
liberalization, while a large share of total foreign exchange earnings would be lost (cf. CBEA, 1997/98).
” E.g.  quota redistr ibution was found necessary each t ime that  production of Caribbean Windward Islands was hit
by tropical  hurricanes.
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Opposite claims have been voiced by governments of dollar banana countries: an open EU market
would increase their agricultural jobs and incomes, while their export earnings would increase.
The US government so far has primarily chosen to represent the position of US banana companies,
rather than appreciating the fact that the EU banana policy has (unintentionally) lowered banana prices
for US consumers or that it has contributed to economic and social development in the Caribbean. The
US government has also stated that their other interests in the banana trade conflict include: maintaining
political stability in the Caribbean, controlling immigration and drug trade from this region. It has
therefore announced its willingness ‘to work with the EU to help the Caribbean producers in a way that
does not hurt US companies and Latin American producers” (USTR, 1996).
Conclusions. The largest gains from EU trade liberalization will be recorded by European consumers,
followed by the most competitive world market producers, i.e. those in dollar banana countries. High-
cost  ACP producers like the Windward Islands and privileged European traders stand to lose most.
Development contribution
The major objective of EU banana policy has been the promotion of social and economic development in
ACP countries. The relevance of this development goal, and the effectiveness of the banana import
regime in achieving it, will be investigated on the basis of the following questions:
l Are banana-exporting ACP countries less developed than dollar banana countries?
l Are ACP economies more dependent on banana exports than dollar banana countries?
l Do ACP countries have other weaknesses in their external economic relations compared to dollar
banana countries?
l Do trade preferences boost social and economic development?
l Are trade preferences a necessary instrument to boost social and economic development?
l Are trade preferences an efficient instrument for transfer of development aid?
Starting with the first question, Table 3 brings together a number of development indicators for both
country groups.12 Each country group appears to consist of poor and relatively better-off countries. The
group of ACP banana falls apart in two subgroups, the Caribbean and the African countries. Caribbean
countries have relatively high levels of real income per capita. The first six of them have income levels
comparable with or higher than European countries like Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and most former
member states of the Soviet Union. The UNDP’s Human Development index data also indicate that
most Caribbean states are in the category most developed countries. The story is quite different with
‘* In terms of population size, the group of African countries is by far the largest (28 mln.); the first six Caribbean
countries in Table 3 have a combined population of one million, while Jamaica and the Dominican Republic
together  count  ten mil l ion people.
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T a b l e  3 Development characteristics of countries exporting bananas to the EU
country
ACP countries
Dominica
Grenada
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent
Belize
SUl-illiUU
Jamaica
Dominican
Republic
Cameroon
Cote  d’Ivoire
Dollar banana
countries
Costa Rica
Panama
Colombia
Ecuador
Honduras
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Notes: a) The F
6118 0.873
5137 0.843 2407
6182 0.838 . .
5650 0.836
5590 0.806 2870
4711 0.792 2548
3816 0.736 2607
3933 0.718
94.0 72.0
98.0 72.0
82.0 71.0
82.0 72.0
70.0 74.0
92.7 70.7
84.4 73.9
81.5 70.0
30 d,
2;‘d’
.  .
.  .
5
20
.  .
.  .
.  .
.  .
12.1
18.3
2120 0.468 1981 62.1 55.1
1668 0.368 2491 39.4 52.1
31.4
46.3
5919 0.889 2889 94.7 76.6 1 9 6.6
6104 0.864 2239 90.5 73.2 26 11.2
6107 0.848 2678 91.1 70.1 7 10.7
4626 0.775 2587 89.6 69.3 30 15.2
2050 0.575 2306 72.0 68.4 47 22.0
3208 0.572 2255 55.7 65.6 5 3 35.3
1580 0.530 2296 65.3 67.3 44 27.2
I is a combin I index of rez mrchasmg  power per cap life expec . . .cy at bntn,  educatton
(adult literacv  and school enrollment). Countries are ranked between 1 (best) and 0 (worst). b) Percentage of the
population l iving at  an income of $1 per day or less.  c)  Combined index for the percentage of the population
without access to safe water, health services, mortality expectation below the age of 40, adult illiteracy and the
percentage of underweight children under age five. The index ranges from  0 (no deprivation) to 100 (deprivation
for total population). d) Percentage of population under national poverty line, according to Internet site of
Caribbean Banana Exporters Association. Data sources: UNDP (1997), World Bank (1997).
Real GDP Human Daily
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regard to Cameroon and C6te d’Ivoire which have much lower income levels, while also performing
poorly on other development criteria. The  three first dollar banana countries in Table 3 also do well on
most development criteria. Slightly worse is the situation in Ecuador, and much worse in Nicaragua,
Guatemala and Honduras where large parts of the population remain in extreme poverty. Development
in the latter three countries is between that of Caribbean and African ACP countries. It can be
concluded that development levels neither generate an objective criterion for trade discriminatim  against
dollar banana countries, nor do they generate an objective reason for granting generic trade preferences
to ACP countries.
A further question is whether ACP countries are more dependent on banana exports than dollar banana
countries. Table 4 presents indicators on export-dependency. It is shown that in only three countries
banana exports contribute ten per cent or more to domestic income: Dominica, St. Lucia and St.
Vincent. These island economies depend for more than half of their  total exports on banana exports to
the EU. Export dependency is also high in Belize. All other ACP countries have a more diversified
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T a b l e  4 Bananas and export dependency
country Banana exports to Exports as % of Banana exports as
EU as % of total GNP, 1994 % of GDP,
exports, 1995 a) 1993194 c,
ACP countries
Dominica 56 24 b, 11.9
Grenada 3 10 b, 0.9
Saint Lucia 76 19 b, 10.2
Saint Vincent 58 25 b, 9.7
Belize 20 20 b, 2.3
surinam 6 23 b’ 3.2
Jamaica 5 63 0.8
Dominican Republic 7 25 0.1
Cameroon 6 30 0.7
Cote d’koire 3 47 0.7
Dollar banana countries
Costa Rica 19 41 6.0
Panama 42 110 2.9
Colombia 5 19 0.7
Ecuador 13 27 3.4
Honduras 9 41 6.5
Guatemala 3 20 0.8
Nicaragua 4 25 0.3
Notes:  a)  ACP export  dependency calculated by Verburg  (1998:s) on basis  of  FAO and Eurostat
figures. Estimates for other countries based on Dollar Banana Trade News Bulletin (Nov. 1997) and
UNCTAD (1996b).  b)  Estimate based on CL4 World Factbook  1996. c) Total banana exports from
UNCTAD (1996a).  d) estimate for 1995. Other data sources: Eurostat  (1997),  World Bank (1996;
1997);  OECD (1996);  UNCTAD (1996~ 1996b).
export and production structure. In the poorest ACP countries banana exports contribute less than one
per cent to domestic income. Only three to seven per cent of their total export earnings stems from
banana exports to the EU. The contribution of banana exports to domestic income in Honduras, Costa
Rica, Ecuador and Panama is three to eight times higher than in most ACP countries. Of all dollar
banana countries, EU imports have the highest contribution to domestic income in Panama and Costa
Rica. Summing up, economic dependency on banana exports to the EU is highest in the three
Windward Islands, followed by Panama and Costa Rica. Differences between the rest of the countries in
Table 4 are relatively small. Motives related to export dependency cannot form a valid reason for a
discriminator
Trade preferences could perhaps be warranted when the balance of payments of ACP countries had
structural weaknesses in comparison with dollar banana countries. Table 5 presents a number of
indicators on non-trade sources of convertible foreign currency. The last column shows the percentage
of exports earnings that again leaves the country in the form of debt-servicing obligations (interest and
repayment of loans). As far as data are available, no systematic difference appears to exists between
ACP countries and dollar banana countries. Development aid flows appear to contribute more to GNP
in ACP economies than in dollar banana countries. Foreign direct investment in most cases contributes
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more to the economies of ACP countries than to that of dollar banana countries. Column 4 indicates that
the wealthiest dollar banana countries have more access to international private capital markets.
Commercial finance (bank loans and export credits) from  this source is non-concessional and implies
future debt-servicing obligations. Even though some dollar banana countries have more access to the
international market for commercial credits, it can be concluded that ACP countries do not lack
alternative non-trade sources of foreign exchange. These data do not support claims that ACP countries
have a stronger relative dependency on export earnings from  bananas.
Table  5 Capital flows  and non-trade sources offoreign currency
Country Total net official Net foreign Total net official Private flows Debt service
development direct development from  all DAC ratio (debt
assistance investment as % assistance countries b, service as % of
received a’ 1995, of GNP. received a’ 1995 1995 expofis ),
(3) as % of GNP 1993 in US$ mIn @In US%) 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ACP countries
Dominica 12.1 5.0 2 4 1 3 4 .  .
Grenada 4.2 9.2 10 - 9 .  .
Saint Lucia 9.6 7.1 4 7 1 2 .
Saint Vincent 20.5 13.4 4 7 -11 .
Belize 3.0 1.8 16 - 3
Surinam 27.6 -10.4 7 7 1 5 5
Jamaica 2.7 2.3 108 2 5 2 21
Dominic. Rep. 1.2 2.0 1 2 4 2 2 9 1 7
Cameroon 6.5 2.1 4 4 4 -167 1 7
CBte d’Ivoire 22.0 0.4 1200 -20 4 0
Dollar banana
countries
Costa Rica 0.3 3.9 2 5 319 1 5
Panama 0.8 -0 .6 5 0 3433 35d’
Colombia 3.7 1.6 231 1604 3 0
Ecuador 1.5 0.9 235 9 1 7 2 2
Honduras 14.1 1.1 411 -12 3 4
Guatemala 1.3 1.6 215 2 2 11
Nicaragua 48.1 2.7 6 6 2 - 5 7 3 8
Notes:  a)  Net disbursements of ODA from  al l  sources.  b)  Private f lows include direct  investment ,  portfol io investment ,
bank loans and export credits. Data sources: World Bank (1996,1997);  OECD (1997).
Trade preferences may operate like a producer subsidy from  abroad. Development economics literature
suggests that producer subsidies can be warranted in two cases. The first case regards producers in a
start-up phase when it is not yet possible to reap the commercial fruits of initial investments, economies
of scale and learning-by-doing. This is the so-called infant indusfv  argument. When producers have no
access to commercial loans to finance their start-up phase, governments could subsidize them to bridge
the period before they have gained commercial viability and can face market competition by themselves.
For this argument to be valid, a pre-fixed time schedule for phasing out the subsidies (preferences) is
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required. Without it, the subsidies or preferences become a form of open-ended ‘socializing’ of private
losses. Former European colonies have been granted preferential trade access for bananas since the very
start of the European Community. Graph 3 has, however, shown that production costs in many ACP
countries are still far from competitive. Afler so many years, preferences (subsidies) to these producers
can no longer be defended with the infant industry argument. When no incentives or real possibilities
exist to make producers more efficient and competitive, endless subsidy (preference) schemes will be
required.
The second case for producer subsidies exists when banana production generates positive external
effects for other sectors of the economy. Positive externalities occur for instance when banana
production creates environmental benefits, supports labour  training, contributes to basic agricultural
research, or makes communication, transport or infrastructure available to the rest of the economy. The
fact that these positive external effects cannot fully be commercially exploited by banana producers
themselves, could then lead to a lower production level than is socially desirable. In that case,
governments may subsidize production till it has reached a socially preferred level. By granting trade
preferences for this motive, the EU Commission puts itself in the role of the government in the country
where the positive externalities arise. In the Caribbean region, banana exports may well generate
positive externalities for the economy in the form of lower shipping costs, because banana reefers offer
spare transport capacity at relatively low freight costs (e.g. Hallam  & Peston,  1997). Other economic
sectors benefit from this advantage as well. Environmental benefits (tree crop cover on erosion-prone
slopes) and the crop’s role in supporting rural production systems could perhaps also be considered as
positive externalities. The presence of positive externalities has to be assessed case by case, and could
warrant the use of subsidies for banana producers. Generic trade preferences form a much too broad-
spectred instrument for this fme-tuning job. The positive externality created for the Windward Island by
the presence of the banana shipping services could be captured by subsidizing the shipping lines with
EU aid for the continuation of their services.
Improvement of competitiveness and diversification form essential elements of economic development in
high-cost mono-export economies. Sticking to traditional primary export products may block dynamic
incentives for economic growth. Primary exports seldom form dynamic growth sectors in developing
country economies and growth impulses mostly come from labour-intensive manufacturing exports (e.g.
Fosu, 1996; Kox, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1995). Therefore, subsidizing a stagnant primary sector
may well have high opportunity costs in terms of missed growth opportunities. Trade preferences
generate additional income for banana traders and producers, but investment in diversification need not
come from these agents. Inadequate development of infrastructure like roads, port facilities and
communication links has been established to be a major bottleneck for diversification in the Eastern
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Caribbean region (PAO, 1996). Governments, rather than the banana sector, has to undertake
investments in roads, ports, industrial estates and education programmes that can form the basis of new
export activities. Therefore, direct EU aid to governments would probably be more effective in
supporting diversification of exports and production than indirect price subsidies to the banana sector.
Of course, diversification takes time, and small banana producers may not benefit from it, while some
live at the edge of poverty (e.g. in Dominica, St. Lucia). Direct, lump-sum income may be needed to
bridge the transition phase. Local governments or local development agencies are in the best position for
low-cost distribution of income deficiency payments to smallholder export producers. Trying to
accomplish this goal by generic trade preferences is like using a battleship for killing mosquitoes.
Aid transfer effectiveness of banana regime, before 1993Graph 4
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Note: a) Of each $5.30 cost to consumers $3 flowed into marketing margins of EU marketers. About
$0.40 went into tax revenue and other internal EU transfers. Net costs to the EU are estimated to be
$1.90. About $0.90 of this went into having bananas produced by relatively inefficient producers.‘3  Only
$1 formed an effective aid transfer to ACP counties (Borell, 1997a).
Trade preferences form a very ineffective device for transferring development assistance to ACP
countries. Research by Bore11 and Yang (1992; 1997a; 1997b) showed that the EU banana regime was
very ineffective in generating aid transfers to banana-dependent ACP countries. They calculated that,
before the 1993 reform, EU consumers paid $1610 mln (through high banana prices) to deliver $302
mln of effective aid to 11 preferred supplier countries. In other words, it cost $5.30 to deliver $1 of net
banana-related aid. The flow of funds is shown in Graph 4. After the 1993 reform, transfer efficiency of
EU banana policy has even deteriorated: it now costs EU consumers $13.25 to effectively transfer $1 of
benefit (Borell, 1997a; 1997b). EU marketers have been the main beneficiaries of the 1993 policy
l3 E.g. yields per hectare in 1995 of Costa Rica, Ecudor  and St Lucia compared as 5.6: 3.0: 1 (FAO 1998).
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package. They realized marketing margins about double the size of what they are in the USA. From the
perspective of the EU’s development policy, the banana regime has proven to be an inefficient device for
transferring aid to banana-dependent ACP countries. The costs of direct development aid to replace a
possible loss of banana exports to the EU are moderate. The four ACP countries which depended most
on banana exports to the EU (cf. Table 4) together export 125 mhr ECU of bananas to the EU in 1995.
The effective value of trade preferences represent only half this amount. Even if the EU would buy these
country’s entire bananas exports and dump it in the sea, this seemingly wasteful action would still create
a large welfare gain compared to the present banana regime.
Conclusions. Preferential trade access for ACP countries and trade discrimination against dollar banana
countries cannot be justified by differences in the development level of both country groups. With
exception of four small Caribbean countries, ACP economies do not depend more on banana exports to
the EU than dollar banana countries. No other economic characteristics of both country groups could be
identified that warrant the present trade discrimination. Trade preferences for ACP banana exporters
cannot be justified by the infant industry argument; their lack of competitiveness in the world banana
market is not of a temporary character. Any positive externalities associated with banana exports can
more efficiently be generated through direct aid. Direct development aid also forms a better way to
promote diversification of exports and production structures of banana-dependent countries.
Banana trade and the environment
Most environmental effects of banana production are of a local scope, and do not cross national
boundaries. It is not evident, therefore, that environmental effects of banana production should play a
role in reform of international banana trade. Moreover, WTO rules do not allow for trade
discriminatory measures based on environmental characteristics of the production process when these
characteristic do not affect the banana product itself. This section argues, however, that there is a
positive reason to include environment-related issues in a package deal to compensate potential losers
of a liberalized European banana trade.
Environmental effects of production. Tree crops like bananas may offer valuable ecological services.
When maturing, they protect soils against erosion in hilly areas, their shadow helps water conservation
and humidity regulation, while they may provide a natural habitat for animals. The occurrence of such
positive ecological services depends on production scale and production methods. Varied, inter-cropped
production systems, like in large parts of smallholder banana production, are more likely to generate
positive environmental effects than mono-crop production systems. Monocrop production of bananas in
large areas is an ecologically vulnerable production system. High levels of chemical plant protection
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inputs are needed to protect plants against insects, bacteria and fGngi.14 Irrigation and fertilizers are
amply used to boost crop yields.
Pesticides are applied through broad-spectre air-spraying and through pesticide-containing plastic bags
put around the racemes.  Airspraying affects all life forms in or near the banana plantations. It caused
health problems for banana workers and their families: diseases, infertility, and lethal accidents. It also
causes water pollution and other disturbance of local ecological balances. Effects may be felt beyond
production regions, e.g. in coastal areas or through pesticide accumulation in migratory birds and fish
(e.g. Colitt, 1994). Ever increasing pesticide quantities or pesticide toxicity are required as the abated
organisms develop resistance. Pesticide use may be stimulated by subsidized pesticides, lacking
penalties for negative externalities and inefficient application routines (e.g. inadequate disposal of
pesticide-containing plastic bags). Heavy use of pesticides is partly caused by demand side conditions.
Western consumers have got used to undamaged and unblemished fruits. Pesticides are seldom applied
to non-export bananas, plantains and cooking bananas.
For construction of banana plantations large areas are deforested with strong temporary erosion
effects.‘5  The wash water of banana packing plants often  still contains agrochemicals residues, causing
off-site water pollution. Finally, banana production generates huge amounts of organic waste (leaves,
raceme stem, part of sub-standard bananas), some 3.5 ton for every ton of export bananas. Traditional
dumps are open-air sites, often situated along river banks. The organic waste has a high biological
oxygen demand leading to fish kill in surface waters. Also nondegradable waste like agrochemical
containers and pesticide-impregnated plastic bags is created which often end up in open-air dumpsI
Banana trade and environment. An important new development is that consumer in OECD countries
increasingly prefer ‘green and clean’ bananas, i.e. bananas without pesticide residues, produced in an
environmentally sound and socially acceptable way. An EC-commissioned study by Eurobarometer in
1997 revealed that around three quarters of the Europeans would buy so-called ‘fair trade’ bananas,
I4 One report from Costa Rica mentions: “Fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides are applied 22 times during the
growth cycle [..I.  In addition, 1.4 litre per hectare of fungicide is applied from airplanes 45 times in one growth
cycle. Of this, 15% is lost to wind drift and falls outside the plantation; 40% ends up on the soil rather than on the
plants; and approximately 35% is washed off by the rain. This results in a 90% loss of the estimated 11 mln. litres
of fungicide, water and oil mix applied each year tot the banana production regions of Costa Rica” (Hemandez and
Witter 1996: 175). On the ecological impacts of banana cultivation see inter alia: Dinham  (1993); Hemandez and
Witter (1996); IUCN  (1992); Linnemann et al. (1993: 97-102); Slutzky (1994); Stover and Simmonds (1987); Wheat
(1996).
I5 According to Rude11 and Joper  (1996) export production of agricultural commodities explains much of West-
African deforestation in the 1970s. In Colombia and Ecuador, destruction of coastal tropical forests stems mainly
from agricultural expansion spurred by export trade (cocoa, bananas, t imber).
Id  Organic waste could at least partially be used for animal feed and paper manufacturing, but these practices are
not yet practiced on a wide scale. Banana multinationals in Central America have undertaken some attempts at
plast ic  recycling.
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grown under ethically-approved conditions in developing countries, provided that such bananas would
be recognizably present in their shops alongside ‘standard’ bananas. A total of 37% of EU consumers
said that they were prepared to pay a premium of 10% above the price of ‘standard’ bananas, for
bananas grown in accordance with environmental and social standards laid down by bodies such as IL0
and UN. A conservative EU estimate quantifies the ‘fair trade’ market segment at 300-400,OOO  tons per
year, that is 8-10% of the total EU market. I7  The fact that EU consumers have such outspoken
preference for bananas which are produced in an environmentally sound way, forms a strong basis for
an ecolabelling scheme for bananas. Some ecolabelling schemes for bananas, joined in EUROBAN,  are
already in operation in the EU.18 The change in consumer attitudes is illustrated by the rapid rise in
market share (to loo/,)  of Max Havelaar ‘Oke’ bananas soon after their introduction in the Butch
market.
Ecolabelling creates a basis for product differentiation and price premiums for bananas that have been
produced in an ecologically sound way. The existence of such price premiums creates new market
opportunities for ACP bananas produced by smallholders under socially acceptable conditions and
without intensive application of agrochemicals. If these aspects are included, productivity differences
between large-scale produced bananas from dollar banana countries and smallholder bananas from the
Caribbean will become smaller. The aforementioned estimate of the ‘fair trade’ market segment in
Europe surpasses total ACP banana exports to the EU. Under a liberalized banana trade regime, the
price premiums for eco-bananas will offer market shelter for exports produced by ACP smallholders. It
is therefore essential to protect such market premiums for eco-bananas. For large banana companies the
stakes are high. They wrestle with the change in preferences, since for them there are trade-offs between
sustainability, productivity and profits. I9
Ecolabelhng schemes and the price premium they protect, can only survive with consumer confidence in
their trustworthiness. Cheating and free-rider behaviour would eventually undermine credibility.
Consumer goodwill also erodes when a confusing jumble of competing ecolabels arises. Large banana
companies already tied to jump on the bandwagon of the ‘fair trade’ movement. The initial success of
banana ecolabels in carving out niche market price premiums induced Chiquita in 1995 to starts its
‘ECO-OK’ ecolabel programme directed at certification for its Costa Rican plantation, although the
label completely disregards agrochemical use (Van de Kasteele, 1997). If cleverly marketed, such
labelling initiatives might cause confusion and eventually undermine consumer trust in ecolabels.
” Source:  European Commission Press Release,  27 November 1997.
I8 See Douglas (1996); WINFA  (1997); Chambron and Smith (1998).
I9 Del Monte manager Murray recently stated: “We definitely feel that ethical production is the key to keeping us
in business”,  recognising  a customers demand for sustainably produced bananas (Wilson 1998).
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Protection of the niche market for premium eco-bananas makes it essential that issuing and monitoring
of ecolabels is kept completely apart from the operators who trade in ecolabelled bananas. Ecolabelling
for bananas preferably should be done by an independent organization which is acceptable for the entire
banana industry. Next section explores the idea that this could be become part of an international
package deal for a liberalized banana trade.
Conclusions. Most dollar bananas come from pesticide-intensive large plantations, while most
Caribbean (ACP) bananas stem from  smallholder production where production is more environmentally
sustainable. WTO rules preclude the use of trade discrimination on the basis of this difference.
Voluntary, market-supported developments offer better perspectives for the future. The sharp rise in
environmental consumer consciousness creates a substantial niche market for eco-bananas with price
premiums that at least partially compensate for higher production costs of smallholder banana
production from ACP countries. In the longer term, large banana companies can be expected to enter
this market. ACP bananas will only keep their market position if they succeed in strengthening their
overall production efficiency. Ecolabels and market premiums for ecobananas can be a dynamising
instrument for achieving an overall change in the industry towards environmentally sound production
methods. In the short term, ecolabelling  schemes could be an important element in a package to
compensate potential losers of liberalized banana trade.
The role of an International Banana Agreement
Reform of the EU banana policy has become unavoidable for several reasons. The EU has agreed to
modify its banana import policy in order to comply with the decision of the WTO’s  Apellate Body. The
EU’s  first proposals did not indicate a decision to liberalize banana imports. WTO-incompatible
elements of the present import licensing scheme will be adapted, but ACP trade preferences remain
intact. A more profound change might come when the Fourth Lom4 Agreement and its Banana Protocol
expire.*’ The European Commission is proposing a successor agreement which makes a distinction
between countries which are and those which are not capable of rapidly integrating into the world
economy. While supporting the former group’s capabilities to integrate in the world market, the latter
group will be eligible for poverty-focused development assistance (European Commission 1996).
Generic trade preferences for all ACP countries would not fit into this approach. With regard to
bananas, this section sketches a policy alternative that could well fit into this new line of thinking.
”  Article 1 of the Banana Protocol states: “In respect of its banana exports to the Community markets, no ACP
State shall  be placed,  as regards to i ts  t radit ional  markets and i ts  advantages on those markets,  in a less favourable
situation than in the past or at present.” The Appellate Body of the WTO rejected that the current EU banana
regime can be defended on basis of this article (WTO 1997).
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A new International Banana Agreement forms the core’ of the proposal. The proposal for an
International Banana Agreement is based on the following considerations:
I .
II.
III.
Iv.
V.
Liberalization of banana trade creates gains for several market players: EU consumers,
governments of dollar banana countries, US government; multinational banana companies.
All importing and exporting countries would benefit from promotion of banana consumption,
improved banana market efficiency and improved trade statistics. All market parties gain from
preserving consumer trust in bananas as a product, including aspects like healthiness and taste,
and confidence that bananas are produced under acceptable ecological and social minimum
ConditiOnS.
Compensation of potential losers of trade liberalization is made easier when part of smallholder
ACP banana production can be sold under a banana ecolabelling scheme that provide a price
premium to compensate for higher production costs.
Compensation remaining losses for is easier done on a burden-sharing basis by all potential
winners. It creates mutual goodwill and speeds up the liberalization procedure. The USA has
already declared its willingness to co-operate with the EU in this area, in the light of its non-
banana interests in the Caribbean region (USTR, 1996).
Safeguarding price premium for eco-bananas depends on a the presence of a simple and reliable
ecolabel issued by an independent, high-standard international organization.
An International Banana Agreement. The aforementioned issues could be promoted by an
International Banana Organization, functioning under the umbrella of an International Banana
Agreement. The latter would be an agreement between governments to regulate common interests with
regard to banana production, trade and consumption. The agreement is created for an agreed time period
(e.g. 5 years), with the possibility of renewal. The agreement aims at reconciling a commitment to free
trade, ecological sustainability of banana production and socio-economic  development interests of
banana-exporting countries. The International Banana Agreement would only govern international trade
in bananas of the Cavendish variety, which is the dominant export banana. Member countries
periodically convene to initiate programmes for implementation of the goals of the agreement and to
assess progress with regard to ongoing projects. The agreement needs a secretariat, called the
International Banana  Organization (IBO), which implements and prepares decisions of the council of
member countries. Box 1 identifies a number of specific tasks for the IBO. The IBO needs not become a
large organization. Specific projects and monitoring tasks can be done on a contracting basis by
external organizations and consultants.
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Operating modalities of the International Banana Agreement can only be worked out in negotiations
between potential member countries. FAO and/or UNCTAD offer the most appropriate international
platform for preparing the agreement, through consultation with potential member countries,
preparation of a negotiation document, and a multi-country negotiation roundtable.
Box I: Potential task areas for the International Banana Organization
* Management of a Smallholder Competitiveness Fund which provides cheap loans to governments
and small-farmer co-operatives from developing countries for projects which aim at strengthening
production efficiency and market competitiveness. Qualification criteria and operating modalities have
to be worked out.
* Management of a Banana Diversification Fund providing low-interests loans and gifts to
governments of high-cost, high-dependency export countries for projects to diminish their structural
dependence on banana exports
* Create and promote a credible international ecolabel for bananas: guarantee a universal banana
ecolabel, issue certificates of origin for certified producers, periodical monitoring of certified producers.
* Management of a Banana Environment Fund formed by voluntary contributions by member
countries, private companies and international organizations.*’ It provides cheap loans for capital-short
national banana producers in developing countries which want to convert their traditional production
methods into more environmentally sound production methods, but which have no access to commercial
credit to finance the necessary investments. Project proposals have to be endorsed by the member
country’s government, and repayment is conditional upon performance. Further qualification criteria
and operating modalities have to worked out.
* Promotion of international banana consumption and ecologically sustainable banana production
* Provide consistent statistics on international banana production, trade and consumption.
* Responsibility for regular daily relations with member countries and international organizations
(UNCTAD, FAO, Common Fund for Commodities, EU, World Bank, Caribbean Banana Exporters
Association, etc.).
* Offer a platform for periodic consultation with environmental and development NGOs and private
sector representatives
* Operate as secretariat for the member country council.
‘*  A similar environment fund, based on voluntary contributions by member countries, was founded under the
International  Cocoa Agreement in 1997.
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The agreement enters into operation when a sufficient number of governments have committed
themselves and have ratified the agreement. The required minimum country participation can be
formulated in terms of X % of world imports (e.g. 60%) and Y % of world exports (e.g. 60%) in a
reference year. Participation of large import markets like the USA, EU and Japan would greatly
improve the chances of success.
The International Banana Agreement could operate under the auspices of UNCTAD, like in the case of
other international commodity agreements. It would also become associated with the UN’s Common
Fund for Commodities which has separate financing facilities for projects that boost the position of
production countries in marketing and distribution of primary commoditiesz2
Positioning of involved parties For the EU, liberalization of its EU banana imports would even be
beneficial without an International Banana Agreement. The latter’s Smallholder Competitiveness Fund
and Banana Diversification Fund make it possible to realize EU policy goals through a joint effort with
other importing countries. Moreover, the agreement makes it possible to deal simultaneously with
environmental issues through the Banana Environment Fund and the ecolabelhng scheme. The EU could
transfer part of its current Lome obligations to the new IBO.=
Potential gains are to be achieved for those parties which in the past refused to participate in an
International Banana Agreement: export countries, the USA and large banana companies. The new
agreement does not, however, aim at market and price intervention (e.g. by quota systems), while
ecolabel scheme is voluntary one. The prospect of free trade in bananas and free entry to the European
market makes co-operation by these players much more likely. The US could bring part of its Caribbean
development policies under the new agreement. Some Latin American countries may have initial
reservations because of the possible initial impact of the ecolabelling scheme on their exports of
‘standard’ bananas. The scheme is however a voluntary, consumer-driven one, and private banana
companies in their countries may wish to participate because of the potential price premium that can be
earned. There is strong evidence that sticking to old-fashioned, ‘dirty’ production methods leads to
future backwardness and competition disadvantage.24 Kaimowitz  (1996) has shown that environmental
policy innovation in Latin America was often induced from abroad. However, the strongest incentive for
Latin American countries to participate will be the additional export opportunities arising after EU
import liberalization.
‘*  The funding mandate of the Common Fund allows for projects to improve the environmental record of banana
production, diversification programmes, and programmes to improve competitiveness of smallholder production of
bananas.
23  The agreement does not rule out the EU’s  (or any other participating government’s) possibilities to undertake
addit ional  bi lateral  and more concessional  development assistance programmes in the countries concerned.
24  Porter and Van der Linde (1995); Pimentel et al. (1993); Whittaker et al. (1995); UNCTAD (1996b).
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Caribbean countries can be expected to have strong initial reservations against conclusion of the new
International Banana Agreement. However, once it exists, they will be better off by joining the
agreement. Membership makes them eligible for the agreement’s funding of investments in alternative
production and export sources. African ACP countries have less reasons for opposing the new
agreement than Caribbean countries could have. They are not very dependent on banana exports and
might be among the main beneficiaries of the competitiveness assistance fund  and the ecolabel
program.25  African countries could benefit from increased world demand after banana trade has been
liberalized.
Consumer information under an International Banana Agreement. The agreement can become a
strong stimulus for environmental innovation in the banana sector, both through its Banana
Environment Fund and through its ecolabel scheme. An ecolabelling scheme issued under auspices of
the agreement preferably has to be supported by all member countries. Even though it is voluntary, the
ecolabel’s position is strengthened when member production countries endorse the IBO ecolubel’s
qualification standards. Rather than starting with full-fledged, high-profile one might start by defining
common minimum standards for qualification. Minimum environmental standards might be adapted
from those used by Euroban: biodiversity (protection of natural areas), pesticides and nutrients
(documentation, control and reduction); prevention of erosion and water pollution; reduction of solid
waste (control, composting, re-use). Over time, the member country council may decide on tightening
certification standards of the IBO ecolabel.
A strong IBO-supported ecolabel for bananas will secure a price premium for banana produced in an
ecologically-sound way. In the short term, this will offer market opportunities for smallholder banana
producers from high-cost export countries. In the longer term,  the ecolabel will support an overall
upgrading of environmental standards and working methods in the banana sector.
Final remarks
Some parties in the EU banana conflict adopt a backward-looking perspective, taking pre-1993
positions as their point of departure. The present EU banana regime, apart from its often-contested
drawbacks, has the large advantage that it created a common benchmark situation for all EU countries.
For the first time since Rome Treaty was negotiated, colonial histories can no longer paralyze
discussion between EU-members. The present EU banana import regime has been defended by
25  For instance, in the Ghanaian  Volta River region a plantation has been set up as the first  plantation in Africa
that will operate according to ‘fair trade’ production criteria (Banana Trade News Bulletin, No. 11112, November
1997).
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development-related arguments. The paper has however shown that these can no longer support the
discriminatory EU trade regime for bananas. Other relevant changes since the early 1990s include the
increased WTO-membership of banana-producing countries, and the increased consumer attention for
environmental and social conditions in banana production. All these changes in policy variables make it
possible now to look forward to future welfare benefits which become possible by changes in the
present EU banana regime.
The largest gains from EU trade liberalization will be booked by European consumers, followed by
competitive world market producers in dollar banana countries, and multinational banana companies.
Most short-term losses will be borne by high-cost Caribbean smallholders and privileged European
traders. The group of most-affected Caribbean export producers is limited in size, which makes it
relatively easy to compensate them. The compensation package can be given the form of a new
International Banana Agreement that reconciles a commitment to free trade in bananas, promotion of
sustainable banana production and promotion of so&o-economic  development in banana-exporting
countries.
Annex tables
Table AI
Source
German welfare losses due to 1993 change in EU banana regime
Method Estim. welfare Welfare change other ‘players’
loss German in Germany
consumers
Suyomard  et Simulation with static partial 106 mln US$
al. (1996) equilibrium model. Elasticities partly
estimated (Denmark, France, Italy (91 mln.
and UK), partly assumed, partly ECU)
from literature. Reference prices
1989-91. Deficiency payments
neutralize effect on EU banana
producers. Constant margins
between import c.i.f. prices and
export fob prices assumed.
iermann & Simulation for 1994 with static 677 mln US$ + 506 mln DM by German
rdlke  (1996) partial equilibrium model. Estimated (1079 mln import traders.price and exchange rate
transmission elasticities for period W
+ 217 mln DM by other
European import traders.
1960-92. + 221 mln DM EU tax
revenue.
?ead  (1995) Simulation with static partial
equilibrium model. Model structure
and assumptions unpublished.
Prices are 1991 EC import unit
values.
157 mln US$
3orell (1997) Simulation with static partial 800 mln US$
equilibrium model. Elasticities partly
estimated, partly assumed
2 5
T a b l e  A 2 Estimates of welfare costs of European banana regime (before and after
I 993) compared with free trade in bananasb)
Source Method Compar i son Welfare  cos ts Net  wevare  cos t s  for  EU:
before/ after for EU
1 9 9 3 consumers
Borel l  and Simulation with static partial before 1993 693 mln US$ 386 min.  US$ (after
Yang equ i l ib r ium mode l .  E las t ic i t ies banana accounting for budget effects)
(1990) assumed.  German 1987 reg ime
consumer price level taken as
free market price.
M a t t h e w s Simulation with static partial before 1993 579 mln US!$ 515 mln US$ (after accounting
(1992) equ i l ib r ium mode l .  E las t ic i t ies banana for lost EU rents and budget
assumed on basis of prior reg ime effects)
studies. Calc.  based on 1989
pr ices
Borel l  and Simulation with static partial before 1993 1438 mln  US$ 442 mln  US$ (a f te r  account ing
Cuthbertso equilibrium model. Elasticities banana for lost EU rents and budget
n (1991) assumed.  US 1987  consumer reg ime e f f e c t s )
quoted in price plus aver. 1979-90
M a t t h e w s premium in  German marke t  over
(1992) US market taken as free market
price.
Borel l  and Simulation with static partial before 1993 1610 mln  US$ 575 mln US$ at 1990 prices
Yang equilibrium  mode l .  E las t i c i t i es banana at 1990 prices
(1992) assumed .  Based  on  pu ta t i ve reg ime
retail prices, incl.  distribution and (386 mln  US$
reta i l  marg in at 1987 prices)
Mclnerney Srmulation  with static partial before 1993 approx.  1600 approx .  575 mln  US$
and Peston  equilibrium model. banana mln  US$
( 1992) =’ reg ime
Read Simulahon  with static partial before 1993 642 mln  US$ 115 mln US$  (after accounting
(1994) equ i l ib r ium model .  Mode l banana for budget effects)
s t ruc tu re  and  assumpt ions reg ime
unpubl ished.  Pr ices are 1991 EC
import unit values.
Borel l Simulation with static partial a f te r  1993 2300 mln  US$
(1994) equ i l ib r ium mode l .  Reta i l  p r i ces , banana
incl.  distribution and retail reg ime (before  reg ime
marg in .  German pr ice  as  f ree change:  1600
marke t  p r i ce mln  US$)
Euro PA Simulation with static partial a f te r  1993 800 - 1000 mln
(1995) equ i l ib r ium mode l .  Reta i l  p r i ces . banana US$
Same e las t i c i t y  assumpt ions  as reg ime
Borel l  (1994)
Note: a) quoted in Hallam  and Peston  ( 1997). b) Applied estimation methods, data sources, discussion of data quality and
precise econometric results are sometimes kept hidden horn  readers, e.g. Read (1994), Matthews (1994).
26
References
Anon. (1992) ‘Information  base sobre case presentado ante Secundo Tribunal Intemacional de1 Agua contra el
Standard Fruit Company’, San Jose, Febrero 1992.
Borell, B. (1997a) ‘Policy making in the EU: the EU bananarama story, the WTO and policy transparency’,
Austral ian Journal  of  Agricul tural  and Resource Economics,  vol .  41 (2) .
Bore& B. (1997b) ‘Well within reach - a low cost way to comply with the WTO banana decision using tariffs’,
Australian Centre for International Economics, Canberra.
Borell, B. (1994) ‘EU Bananarama III’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1386, World Bank, Washington.
Borell, B. and M. Yang (1992) ‘EC Bananarama 1992 - The Sequel: The EC Commission Proposal’. WPS
No. 958, International Economics Dept., World Bank, Washington.
Bore& B. and S. Cuthbertson  (1991) ‘EC Banana Policy 1992: picking the best option’, Centre for
International Economics, Canberra.
Borell, B. and M. Yang (1990) ‘EC Bananarama 1992’, WPS No. 523, International Economics Dept., World
Bank, Washington.
CBEA (1997/98)  ‘CBEA On-line’, Website  of the Caribbean Banana Exporters Association (http://
www.cbea.org).
Chambron, A.-C. and A. Smith (1998) ‘Bananas: paradise or jungle ?‘, in Fair Trade Yearbook 1998 (Dutch
edition) European Fair Trade Organ&ion,  Maastricht, pp. 83- 10 1.
Colitt, R. (1994) ‘Banana fungicide poisoning Ecuadorian shrimps’, Financial Times, March 3rd.
Deardorff,  A (1994) ‘Third-country effects of a discriminatory tariff,  The World Economy, vol. 17 (2).
Deodhar. S.Y. and I.M. Sheldon (1995) ‘Is foreign trade (im)perfectly  competitive? - an analysis of the German
market for banana imports’, Journal ofAgricultural  Economics, vol. 46 (3) pp. 336-48.
Dinham,  B. (1993) The pesticide hazard - a global health and environmental audit, Zed Books. London.
Douglas, J. (1996) ‘What is meant by a fair trade banana?‘, in TRAIDE  Briefing, No. 4, November 1996.
Utrecht.
Ellis. F. (1983) Las transnacionales def banano en Centroamerica, Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana.
San Jose.
Euro PA and Associates (1995) ‘Commentary and analysis on the EU Banana Regime’, R81 A, Euro PA and
Associates, Cambridgeshire.
European Commission (1996) ‘Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries
on the eve of the 2 1 st  century: challenges and options for a new partnership’, EU. Brussels.
Eurostat  (1997) ‘External trade of the European Union with the ACP countries and the OCTs 1992-96’,
Statistical OfIice of the European Communities, Luxemburg.
FAO (1996) ‘Banana diversification: major issues and constraints’, Committee on Commodity Problems.
Intergovernmental Group on Bananas, FAO, Rome.
FAO (1998),  FAOSTAT: statistical database, available at http://apps.fao.org  retrieval date 30/3/1998,  Rome.
Fosu, AK (1996) ‘Primary exports and economic growth in developing countries’, The World Economy, vol.
19, pp.465-74.
Guyomard, H., C. Laroche and Ch. Moue1 (1996) ‘An economic assessment of the common market
organisation  for bananas in the European Union’, Institut de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA),
Rennes.
Hallam, D. and M. Peston  (1997) ‘The political economy of Europe’s Banana Trade’, Occasional Paper no. 5,
Dept. of Agricultural and Food Economics, University of Reading Reading.
Hermann.  R and J. T&e (1996) ‘Ausgerechnet Banane.. .: Gkonomische  Effekte der EU-Bananemnarktreform
auf den Bananenmarkt in Deutschland’, Spiegel der Forschung, Jg. 13 (2).
Hemandez, C.E. and S.G. Witter (1996) ‘Evaluating and managing the environmental impact of banana
production in Costa Rica: a systems approach’, Ambio, vol. 25 (3) May, pp. 171-178.
IUCN (1992) ‘Evaluation of the social and environmental impact of the ~MM expansion in Sarapiqui,
Tortuguero and Talamanca’. in The world of bananas - Background document WIlVFA  seminar on Fair
Trade,  12-13 August  1997,  WINFq  Norwich.
Kaimowitz,  D. (1996) ‘The political economy of environmental policy reform in Latin America’, Development
and Change, vol. 27, pp. 344-52.
Kasteele, A. van de (1996) ‘The banana production chain’, Food World / IUF. Maarssen.
Kox, H. (1997) ‘A note on primary exports and growth’, Development Economics Seminar Paper No. 97-3/l,
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
27
Krugman,  P. and M.Obstfeld  (1994) International economics: theory and policy, Harper-Collins, Third edition,
New York.
Linnemamt,  H., H. Kox, C. van der Tak and H. de Vries (1993) ‘Preconditions for International Commodity-
Related Environmental Agreements - Results of a pre-feasibility study’, Working Paper ICREA Project,
Free University, Amsterdam.
Lowe. M. (1996) ‘ELI-Caribbean relations after 2000’. Paper presented for Caribbean Council for Europe
(November 1995)  Capitulos, SELA 10, 1996.
Lowe, Ph. (1998) ‘EU helping banana producers adapt’, Letter published in Financial Times, 2 1 January.
Matthews, A. (1992) ‘The European Community’s banana policy after 1992’, Discussion Papers in Agricultural
Economics No. 13, University of Giessen, Giessen.
McInemy,  J. and M. Peston  (1992) ‘Fair trade in bananas?‘, Report No. 239, University of Exeter.
Mokhiber. R. and A. Wheat (1995) ‘Chiquita’s top banana’, A4ultinationalA4onitor,  December.
OECD (1996) Development Co-operation - Development Assistance Committee Report  1996,  OECD, Paris.
OECD (1997) Geographical  d is tr ibut ion of$nancialflows  to aid recipients  1992-1996,  OECD, Paris.
Pimentel. D. et al. (1993) ‘Enviromnental and economic effects of reducing pesticide use in agricuhure’,
Agriculture,  ecosystems and environment.  vol. 46, pp. 273-88.
Porter, M.E. and C. van der Linde (1995) ‘Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness
relationship’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9 (4),97-l  14.
Read R (1994) ‘The EC internal banana market: the issues and the dilemma’, The World Economy, vol. 17
(2) pp. 219-35.
Ross-Robinson. H. and Associates (1997) ‘The U.S. and Chiquita at the W.T.O.‘, Ross-Robinson and
Associates, Washington.
Rudel, T. and J. Roper (1996) ‘Regional patterns and historical trends in tropical deforestation’, 1976-1990: a
qualitative comparative analysis’, Ambio, vol. 25 (3) pp. 160-166.
Sachs. J. and A. Warner (1995) ‘Natural resource abundance and economic growth’, Development Discussion
Paper No. 5 17a. Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University, Cambridge.
Stover, R.H. and N. Simmonds (1987) Bananas, Longman,  London
Verburg, A. (1998) ‘Banana’s: a slippery subject’, Faculty of Economic Sciences and Econometrics, Dept. of
Development Economics and Agricultural Economics, Free University, Amsterdam.
UNDP ( 1997) Human Development Report I99 7, Oxford University Press, New York I Oxford
UNCTAD (1996) Commodity  Yearbook 199.5,  UN, New York.
UNCTAD (1996) Handbook o f  in ternat ional  trade and development  s tat is t ics  199.5,  UN,  New York.
UNCTAD (1996b) ‘The relationship of environmental protection to international competitiveness, job creation
and development’, Paper for the Commission on Sustainable Development, Fourth Session, CSD, New
York
USTR (1996) ‘The banana issue’, Declaration by the Oflice of the United States Trade Representative, 23
December 1996 (website  http://www.ustr.gov/report&anana1996/).
Wheat, A. (1996) ‘Toxic bananas’, MultinationalMonitor,  September 1996.
Whittaker, G. et al. (1995) ‘Restricting pesticide use: the impact on profitability by farm size’, Journal of
Agricul tural  and Applied Economics,  vol. 27 (2) pp. 352-62.
WINFA (1997) ‘The world of bananas’, Background document WINFA seminar on Fair Trade, 12-13 August
1997, WINFA, Norwich.
World Bank (1996) World Development Report 1996, Oxford University Press, New York
World Bank (1997) World Development Indicators 1997, World Bank, Washington.
World Trade Organisation (1997) ‘European Communities - regime for the importation, sale and distribution of
bananas’, AB-1997-3, Report of the Appellate Body, Document WT/DS27/AB/R,  WTO, Geneva.
28
